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Affects the Outlook 
Robert B. Litterman 
Assistant Vice President 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
The U.S. economy should grow strongly in 1986, but 
slower growth and higher inflation will occur in 1987, 
according to an econometric forecasting model developed 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
1 The model 
projects that economic growth, the inflation-adjusted 
gross national product (real GNP), will accelerate in the 
next couple of quarters. In 1987, however, real GNP 
growth is projected to decline to near its historical average 
of 3.5 percent. Over the 1986-87 forecast period, the 
model predicts inflation to rise gradually but steadily from 
its current level of around 3 percent to nearly 6 percent in 
1987. 
This current forecast differs from the model's above-
average growth, low inflation forecast published in last 
fall's Quarterly Review (see Litterman 1984a). In this 
paper we explore some of the reasons behind these differ-
ences and find that they can be attributed to two sources: 
(1) revisions to the historical data used to generate the 
forecasts and (2) new economic information in 1985, 
particularly changes in financial variables (interest rates, 
the money supply, the value of the dollar, and stock 
prices). We then focus on the new information in 1985 
and attempt to use it to gauge the impact of recent 
monetary policy actions on future real growth and infla-
tion. Our results support the view that an unexpectedly 
expansionary monetary policy in 1985 may have raised 
both the short-term prospects for real growth and the long-
term prospects for inflation. 
The Current Forecast for 1986-87 
The model's current forecast for 1986-87 was generated 
using data available on December 13, 1985. The fore-
casts for three economic indicators of primary interest— 
real GNP growth, the unemployment rate, and infla-
tion—are presented in Charts 1-3. Each chart shows a 
mean forecast surrounded by a range of uncertainty with-
in which the actual outcome can be expected to fall 70 per-
cent of the time. We emphasize this range (depicted by 
the shaded confidence bands) because it illustrates the 
large degree of uncertainty inherent in economic forecast-
ing. Since any economic forecasting model will regularly 
be off the mark, it is important to be able to quantify how 
wide of the mark, on average, a forecast is likely to be. The 
point forecasts and levels for the three indicators, along 
with their postwar average values, are reported in Table 
1. (To compare the model's forecast with those of other 
economists, see the box.) 
Strong Real Growth 
The current forecast includes very strong real growth in 
early 1986 followed by slower growth in 1987. A closer 
look at the components of real GNP, also shown in Table 
1, indicates where the growth is projected to occur. We 
can see that growth in 1986 is expected to be broadly 
!The forecast presented in this article is generated by a Bayesian vector 
autoregression (BVAR) model developed by research economists at the Minne-
apolis Fed. This statistical model projects a group of economic variables on the 
basis of their past behavior. Since 1982, the model has been used within the Bank 
for forecasting and policy analysis. A description of the model and a summary of 
the economic outlook as of November 1984 were published in the fall 1984 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (see Litterman 1984a). 
For a general introduction to the methodology used to create this type of model, 
see Todd 1984. 
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Charts 1-3 
The Model's Forecast for U.S. Growth, 
Unemployment, and Inflation 
1984-3rd Quarter 1985, Actual; 4th Quarter 1985-1987, 
Forecast With 70 Percent Confidence Bands* 
Chart 1 Growth (Real GNP) 
(Quarterly Percentage Change at Annual Rate) 
% 
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Chart 2 Unemployment Rate 
(As Percentage of Civilian Labor Force) 
Chart 3 Inflation (GNP Deflator) 
(Quarterly Percentage Change at Annual Rate) 
'Most likely forecast surrounded by a range within which the variable is likely to fall 
70 percent of the time, based on 1,000 simulations. 
Sources of basic data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
based, with especially strong growth in consumer spend-
ing for durable goods, business fixed investment, and 
residential investment; about-average growth in con-
sumer spending for nondurable goods and services; and 
below-average growth in government purchases. Inven-
tory investment (the change in business inventories) is 
expected to contribute a small amount to growth over 
1986, while net exports are basically expected to remain 
flat. 
This component analysis of projected growth suggests 
one area where the model's forecast may be too strong. 
Table 1 clearly shows that the biggest boost to real growth 
is projected to occur in the business fixed investment 
component; however, this projection is much stronger 
than recent surveys of investment plans. (See, for ex-
ample, McGraw-Hill Economics 1985 andBNA 1985.) 
Although such surveys are biased downward, on average, 
and are often far from accurate, they do contain informa-
tion which the model does not factor into its forecast. A 
projection of forecast errors on such survey data suggests 
that if the survey results were added to the model, they 
would reduce the growth forecast for investment by a few 
points. This adjustment would reduce real GNP growth 
by perhaps 1 percentage point to roughly 4.6 percent in 
1986. 
The component analysis of real GNP for 1987 reveals 
that real growth is projected to slow due to weak con-
sumer spending and investment. Residential investment, 
in particular, is projected to fall significantly. Overall, real 
growth would be even worse in 1987 except that a 
lessening trade deficit is projected to contribute to growth. 
The forecast for 1987 also includes the possibility of 
recession (defined here as two consecutive quarters of 
negative real GNP growth). Simulations run on the model 
indicate that the probability of a recession is only 
3 percent in 1986, but the probability jumps to 18 percent 
in 1987. And while the odds are about l-in-2 of observing 
just one quarter of negative GNP growth in 1986, the 
odds jump to 3-in-4 that there will be at least one negative 
quarter in 1987. 
Consistent with the forecast of strong real growth in 
1986, the model projects the unemployment rate to 
decline rapidly, reaching 6 percent by the end of 1986. 
Unemployment is then expected to decline slowly in 
1987, reaching 5.5 percent by the end of the year. 
Rising Inflation 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the model's forecast 
is its projection of a steady increase in inflation through-
out the 1986-87 forecast period. Inflation, measured by 
growth in the GNP price deflator, is expected to be 4.3 
3 Table 1 
The Model's Point Forecasts for 1986-87 With U.S. Postwar Averages 
Growth Rates 4th Quarter Levels 
(% Change 4th Qtr. Over 4th Qtr.) (Billions of 1972 $) 
Indicator  1986  1987 
U.S. Average 
Since WWII  1986  1987 
Real Gross National Product (GNP)  5.6%  3.6%  3.5%  $1,792.6  $1,857.6 
Consumer Spending  4.5  2.4  3.5  1,163.8  1,192.3 
Durable Goods  9.7  0.8  6.4  205.4  207.1 
Nondurable Goods & Services  3.5  2.8  3.3  958.3  985.2 
Investment  13.0  5.1  8.5  321.6  337.9 
Business Fixed  10.1  7.6  4.7  240.4  258.5 
Residential  8.2  -4.9  5.2  69.5  66.1 
Change in Business Inventories  —  —  —  11.8  13.2 
Net Exports  —  —  —  -28.7  -17.3 
Government Purchases  1.9  2.6  4.3  335.9  344.7 
Civilian Unemployment Rate  —  —  5.6*  6.0**  5.5** 
Inflation (GNP Deflator)  4.3  5.7  4.1  243.81  257.7t 
"The postwar average for the civilian unemployment rate is a level. 
"The civilian unemployment rate is a percentage of the labor force, 
t Inflation is an index (1972=100). 
Sources of basic data: U.S. Departments of Commerce and Labor 
percent in 1986 and 5.7 percent in 1987. 
Along with the deflator, all price variables in the model 
are expected to start rising more rapidly, especially in 
1987. For example, the prices of raw industrial commodi-
ties, which fell by 16.8 percent from June 1984 to 
October 1985, are projected to rise by 23 percent in 
1986. Energy prices, which have remained essentially 
flat for over four years, are projected to grow by 
4.2 percent in 1986.
2 The model projects the consumer 
price index to rise from its current rate of about 4 percent 
to 6 percent by the end of 1987, whereas it has the 
producer price index rising only 2 percent in 1986 and 
3.8 percent in 1987. In addition, all three measures of 
wages used in the model—the average hourly earnings in 
manufacturing, the employment cost index, and the 
compensation of employees per unit of output—are 
projected to grow at rates about 1 percent higher than 
those projected for the deflator. 
Comparing the Current Forecast 
With Last Year's 
In analyzing the current forecast, we start by comparing 
the current outlook for 1986-87 with last year's outlook 
for these years (see Table 2, columns 1, 2, and 4).
3 The 
current forecast for 1986 includes stronger real growth as 
well as higher inflation than was forecasted a year ago. In 
addition, the unemployment rate is projected to be much 
lower than was anticipated last year. The current real 
2The model's current energy price projection for 1986 does not yet take into 
account OPEC's recent decision to allow oil prices to be set by market conditions. 
Experts expect this decision to result in lower oil prices. Information about this 
decision will eventually enter the model through the index of spot market prices 
for raw industrial materials, lower energy prices, and perhaps through movements 
in interest rates and other financial variables. 
3Last year's forecast for 1986 and 1987 is taken from the model forecast 
generated on November 21,1984, which formed the basis of the national outlook 
article in the fall 1984 Quarterly Review (see Litterman 1984a). The model's 
forecast for 1987, included here, was not actually published in that article. 
4 Robert B. Litterman 
Monetary Policy and the Outlook 
How the Model's Forecast Compares With Others 
It may be of some interest to compare the model's current 
forecast for 1986-87 with forecasts other economists have 
made for these years. To find out what other economists 
have predicted, we consulted Blue Chip Economic Indi-
cators (Blue Chip 1985 a, 1985b), a monthly newsletter that 
publishes a consensus forecast averaging the forecasts of 
approximately 50 business economists. To compare the two 
forecasts, our model's forecast was converted from fourth-
quarter-over-fourth-quarter rates to year-over-year rates. 
The year-over-year rates for both forecasts are shown in the 
accompanying table. 
As the table indicates, our model's current forecast for 
1986 calls for much stronger growth than does the Blue Chip 
consensus, which expects below-average growth in 1986. In 
fact, if the model's forecast had been included on the Blue 
Chip list, it would have ranked as the fourth most optimistic 
growth forecast for 1986. Our model's unemployment 
forecast for 1986 is much lower than the consensus rate. 
However, the model basically agrees with the consensus 
forecast for inflation in 1986. 
For 1987, our model agrees with the consensus projec-
tion that real growth will slow slightly. But the model 
continues to be more optimistic about unemployment in 
1987, projecting a slow decline over the year to 5.7 percent; 
in contrast, the consensus shows no change from its 
unemployment prediction for 1986. The model's inflation 
forecast for 1987 is higher than what the consensus predicts. 
Comparing Our Model's Forecast 
With the Blue Chip Consensus Forecast 
Indicator 
Growth Rates* 
(% Change Year-Over-Year) 
Our Model Consensus 
1986 
Growth (Real GNP) 4.7% 3.1% 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 6.41 7.11 
Inflation (GNP Deflator) 3.6 3.6 
1987 
Growth (Real GNP) 4.3% 2.7% 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 5.7 f 7.11 
Inflation (GNP Deflator) 5.3 4.6 
* For purposes of comparison, our model's forecasts have been converted from 
4th quarter-over-4th-quarter to year-over-year percentage changes, 
t The civilian unemployment rate is a percentage of the labor force and 
an annual average. 
Sources: BVAR model forecast of December 13,1985; Blue Chip 1985b 
(for 1986 forecast) and 1985a (for 1987 forecast) 
growth forecast for 1987 is now lower than anticipated 
last year, while the inflation forecast is now much higher. 
The unemployment rate in 1987 is again much lower than 
projected last year.
4 
What factors are responsible for the differences be-
tween the two forecasts—for the strength of the model's 
current forecast for 1986 and for its projection of slower 
growth and higher inflation for 1987? We answer this 
question by treating last year's forecast as a starting point 
and then attributing the differences between it and the 
current forecast to two main sources: (1) revisions made 
to the historical data and (2) new economic information in 
1985. Once we have separated out these two sources of 
differences between the forecasts, we focus on the second 
source and ask whether or not monetary policy actions 
have led to significant changes in the outlook for 1986— 
87. 
Revisions to Historical Data 
When last year's forecast was generated on November 
21, 1984, the model used a set of historical data (dated 
from January 1948 to October 1984) which has since 
been revised.
5 Because these revisions were incorporated 
into the historical data set used to generate the current 
forecast, we need to determine how much they account 
for differences between last year's forecast and the 
current one. To do this we generate last year's forecast 
using the revised historical data and then compare that 
4The fact that last year's forecast differs from the current one does not 
necessarily imply that last year's forecast was bad. In fact, last year's forecast 
performance proved quite accurate in some respects. See the Appendix for a 
closer evaluation of the model's performance in 1985. 
5The revised historical data are those available as of December 13, 1985. 
They do not include the major revisions to the national income and product ac-
counts released by the Commerce Department on December 20, 1985. 
5 forecast with last year's original forecast (see Table 2, 
columns 2,3, and 5). Column 5 shows that changes in the 
forecast due to revisions in the historical data, although 
noticeable, are not large relative to the total changes 
shown in column 4. 
New Information in 1985 
Having accounted for the first source of differences 
between the two forecasts, we can now focus on the 
second—the effects of new information in 1985 on last 
year's forecast. These effects are shown in Table 2, where 
we compare the current forecast (column 1) with the 
1984 forecast that uses the revised historical data 
(column 3). The differences between these two forecasts 
(column 6) indicate the part of the change in the outlook 
that can be attributed to new information in 1985. We see 
that this new information has actually had a significant 
impact on real GNP growth and inflation, and that the 
impact on inflation has been larger than was apparent 
from the original forecast differences shown in column 4. 
Causes for Differences: 
The Role of Monetary Policy 
Having found that new information in 1985 contributed 
significantly to the change in the 1986-87 outlook since 
last year's forecast, we can now focus on this new 
information and attempt to pinpoint what caused the 
differences between the two forecasts. To find the source 
of these differences, we must first look for areas where the 
model was surprised by the new information in 1985— 
that is, areas where last year's forecast for 1985 was in 
error. This approach to analyzing the differences between 
the forecasts in terms of recent surprises in the data is 
based on the following intuition: If every economic 
variable had behaved in 1985 in the way it was projected 
to behave in last year's forecast, then today we would 
have no new reason to revise the current outlook; that is, 
the current forecast should basically coincide with last 
year's. Thus, the difference between the current forecast 
and last year's forecast for 1986-87 can be attributed to 
the surprises observed in the new data during 1985. 
The model can identify surprises in the data that we 
observed in 1985 and can project what the implications of 
these surprises are for the future of the economy. The 
model can tell us, for example, that the stock market 
increased more than was expected in 1985 and that as a 
result, real growth is likely to be higher in the near future 
than it would have been otherwise. 
The model alone, however, cannot interpret these 
surprises in terms of economically meaningful events. It 
cannot tell us, for example, what new information caused 
Table 2 
Accounting for Differences Between the Current Forecast 
and Last Year's Forecast for 1986-87* 
Forecasts  Differences 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Indicator 
Last Year's 
Current Last Year's With Revised 
(Dec. 13,1985) (Nov. 21,1984) Historical Data" 
Between Current 
and Last Year's 
(1)—(2) 
Due to Revised 
Historical Data" 
(3)-(2) 




Growth (Real GNP) 5.6% 3.9% 4.1% 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 6.0 7.2 6.9 
Inflation (GNP Deflator) 4.3 3.2 2.7 
1987 
Growth (Real GNP) 3.6% 3.8% 3.9% 
Civilian Unemployment Rate 5.5 7.1 6.8 



















•Growth rates are measured 4th quarter over 4th quarter; the unemployment rate is the 4th quarter level. 
'Minor revisions made to the historical data set (January 1948-October 1984) by the U.S. Department of Commerce as of December 13, 1985. 
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the stock market to increase. To interpret the new 
information in 1985 in terms of cause and effect, we have 
to make some assumptions about the structure of the 
economy beyond the purely statistical correlations cap-
tured in the model. 
We now attempt to make such an interpretation. In 
particular, we attempt to answer the question: What role 
did unexpected changes in monetary policy play in 
changing the outlook for 1986 and 1987?
6 To answer this 
question, we separate the surprises in the 1985 data into 
two sources: monetary policy surprises and other eco-
nomic surprises (or shocks). This separation allows us to 
measure the extent to which monetary policy surprises 
are responsible for the changes in the outlook for real 
growth and inflation since last year's forecast. 
Defining Monetary Policy for the Model 
If we could observe monetary policy actions directly, we 
could simply add them to the model to measure their 
effect on the economy. However, because we don't 
observe policy actions directly but do observe their 
effects, we must make some assumptions that define what 
we mean by policy in the context of the model's variables. 
In order to identify surprise policy actions, we specify a 
set of impacts that we expect to see when an unexpected 
monetary policy action occurs. To identify the impact of a 
monetary policy action, we ask, What happens when the 
Fed injects more reserves into the banking system than 
were expected? We predict that within the same month of 
the policy action, there would be a lowering of interest 
rates, an increase in the monetary aggregates, a fall in the 
value of the dollar, and a rise in stock prices. We call this 
set of impacts a monetary policy vector, denoted by M, 
and display our assumptions about the appropriate 
relative weights for each vector component in Table 3. 
(The relative weights are based on the type of analysis 
described in Litterman 1984b.) 
Projecting the Economy's Response 
Given this definition of policy as a set of impacts, the 
model projects how the economy will respond over time 
to such a policy action. According to the model, in 
response to a monetary policy action that immediately 
lowers the federal funds rate by 1 percentage point (or 
100 basis points)—and that affects the remaining com-
ponents as indicated in Table 3—both money growth and 
real growth are raised for the next two years, with the 
bigger impact in the first year following the action. 
(Money growth increases by 1.3 percentage points in the 
first year and 0.7 of a point in the second. Real growth 
increases by 0.7 of a percentage point in the first year and 
Table 3 
The Monetary Policy Vector* 
Variable Weight of Vector Component 
Interest Rates 
Federal Funds Rate -1.00% 
T-Bill Rate -0.90 
Bond Yields -0.50 
Monetary Aggregates 
Monetary Base 0.05 
M1 0.10 
M2 0.05 
Value of the Dollar -3.00 
Stock Prices (S&P 500) 2.50 
Other Variables 0.00 
'Percentage change in the components of monetary policy vector M during the 
month in which an unexpected monetary policy action occurs. 
0.5 of a point in the second.) Following the more 
accommodative monetary policy, inflation also increases 
and continues to increase over time. (In the first year, 
inflation is increased by only 0.1 of a percentage point, 
while in the second it is increased by 0.4 of a point.) 
Unemployment also responds more strongly in the 
second year (being lowered by 0.1 of a percentage point in 
the first year and 0.2 of a point in the second). The 
Treasury-bill rate stays lower after the first year but then 
rises slightly above its originally forecasted value in the 
second. (The T-bill rate remains 0.6 of a percentage point 
lower after one year but rises to 0.1 of a percentage point 
above its forecasted value in the second.) 
Assumptions Identifying 
Monetary Policy in 1985 
In each monthly time period t, we assume the economy is 
subject to a vector of economic shocks Et and an 
unexpected monetary policy action. The scalar mt gives 
the magnitude and sign (positive or negative) of the policy 
action at time t. The impacts on the economy in time t are 
6Unexpected changes in policy are emphasized because the component of 
policy actions that is expected does not change the outlook from last year's. 
7 Table 4 
Projecting Monetary Policy Actions and Innovations in 1985 
(Standard Errors) 













Base  M1  M2  Values 
Stock Prices 
(S&P 500) 
Nov. 84  0.7  -0.4  -0.2  -0.5  0.3  2.2  2.0  0.8  -0.2 
Dec. 84  -0.3  -1.9  -1.0  -1.0  -1.1  0.1  -0.3  2.7  -0.3 
Jan. 85  -0.7  0.7  -0.4  -0.3  -1.2  0.3  0.7  0.9  1.2 
Feb. 85  -1.3  -0.1  1.0  1.0  -1.2  0.7  -1.1  2.1  1.1 
Mar. 85  -0.4  -0.4  0.1  1.2  0.6  -0.5  -2.2  -0.8  -0.6 
Apr. 85  2.8  -0.8  -1.1  -2.2  0.0  -0.0  -2.8  -3.7  0.2 
May 85  0.9  -0.4  -0.7  -1.3  0.2  0.9  1.5  1.1  0.5 
June 85  3.3  -0.7  -0.9  -1.8  2.5  2.2  1.4  -1.4  0.3 
July 85  -0.7  1.1  0.3  1.7  -1.8  -0.7  -1.7  -2.9  0.3 
Aug. 85  1.0  -0.3  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  1.6  0.4  -0.9  -0.8 
Sept. 85  -1.3  -0.3  -0.3  0.5  -1.1  -0.2  -1.2  1.0  -0.5 
Oct. 85  2.7  -0.2  -0.2  -0.9  -1.8  -2.4  -1.9  -4.5  0.4 
given by mtM. The unexpected movements (or innova-
tions) observed in the data Ut are the sum of these 
components; that is, 
Et + mtM= Ut= Yt~ t-xYt 
where t-xYt is the forecast made in the previous month, 
time t— 1, of the vector of economic variables Yt. 
Because we do not separately observe Et and mt, we 
use observations on Ut, along with our assumptions about 
the impacts of monetary policy embedded in Mf to 
estimate mr In order to generate these estimates, how-
ever, we also have to make two more assumptions. The 
first concerns whether or not the policy actions are 
correlated with the economic shocks. The second con-
cerns how much of the variation in the data, on average, is 
due to unexpected policy actions. 
The first assumption is that monetary policy actions 
are uncorrelated with economic shocks. The lack of an 
immediate correlation between surprise policy actions 
and most economic shocks can be justified in monthly 
data by the lags associated with measuring economic 
variables. For example, an economic shock in December 
would not appear in the data until January, and a policy 
action reacting to the shock would probably not occur 
until January or later. 
The second assumption, which concerns the average 
size of the policy actions, has an upper limit placed on it 
by the covariance matrix of the surprise observations in 
the data. For example, we cannot assume that un-
expected policy actions contribute more variance to 
interest rates than is actually observed in the data.
7 This 
limitation leads to a choice of 0.07 for the variance of m. 
This value implies that policy actions cause unexpected 
movements in the federal funds rate of about 26 basis 
7More generally, given the assumption that there is no correlation between^ 
and mt, the variance of m, denoted must be such that 
ZE=Z.u-a
2mMM' 
(where is the variance of Et and Z^/ is the variance of Ut) is nonnegative 
definite. We have chosen to assume that the variance of m is close to but below the 
level where this condition becomes binding. 
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Table 5 
Effects of Unexpected Monetary Policy Actions in 1985 
on the Outlook for 1986-87* 
Differences Between Current 










Actions in 1985 
(mtM) 
1986 
Growth (Real GNP) 1.5% 
Civilian Unemployment Rate —0.9 
Inflation (GNP Deflator) 1.6 
1987 
Growth (Real GNP) -0.3% 
Civilian Unemployment Rate -1.3 













points per month, on average, which composes about one-
fourth of the total variation of interest rates. Policy-
induced variation is less in the other variables (monetary 
aggregates, value of the dollar, stock prices). 
Given these two assumptions, we can easily form the 
linear-least-squares projection of mt on the observed 
innovations Ut. This projection gives us the most likely 
value for the policy action, based on our observation of 
the new data. We do this for each month, from November 
1984 through October 1985.
8 In Table 4 we display our 
projections of monetary policy actions together with the 
components of Ut for some of the important policy 
indicators. We see that the monetary policy actions 
closely follow the unexpected movements in interest rates 
(that is, when mt is positive, interest rates are negative— 
and vice versa). We see, for instance, that in each of the 
six months where the policy action mt exceeded 1 stan-
dard error, the innovation in bond yields moved in the 
opposite direction, as expected. The possible exception is 
December 1984. (In that month, interest rates declined 
sharply, but the other indicators—the monetary aggre-
gates, the value of the dollar, and stock prices—all moved 
in the opposite direction than what we associate with 
monetary ease. So our estimate of the policy action is 
essentially zero for that month.) For the most part, 
though, the model estimates that monetary policy in 1985 
was more accommodative than expected. The mean of 
the total policy actions was a positive 0.56 standard error; 
this means that, on average, monetary policy actions 
lowered the federal funds rate by 15 basis points each 
month. Especially in April, June, and October 1985, 
monetary policy was surprisingly stimulative. The June 
policy action alone is estimated to have lowered the fed 
funds rate by 86 basis points. 
8One unfortunate complication is that when we generated the forecast of 
November 21,1984, we had more up-to-date information about some variables 
than others. In order to maintain that forecast as a baseline, we define the 
innovations for November 1984 to be the surprises relative to information we had 
available at the time of the forecast. Defined this way, the interest rate surprise, for 
example, is much smaller than it would have been if defined in the standard way 
relative to information available as of October 1984. Thus, even though 
unexpected monetary policy actions had already lowered interest rates as of 
November 21, 1984, we do not include those actions as surprises in 1985. 
9 Measuring the Effect on the Outlook 
We now return to our original question: How much of an 
effect did these unexpected monetary policy actions have 
in changing the 1986-87 outlook since last year? We 
generate an answer by running simulations on the model 
while applying the estimated monetary policy actions in 
1985. In measuring the effect of these policy actions, we 
take into account both their direct impact as additive 
disturbances and their impact on the estimated co-
efficients of the model. We start by forecasting values for 
November 1984, just as we did to make last year's 
forecast. Then we add the impact of the monetary policy 
action estimated for November 1984 to our forecasted 
values. Next we treat these new values as if they were 
actual data, update the model's coefficient estimates, and 
generate a forecast for December 1984. We then add the 
impact of our estimated monetary policy action in 
December 1984 to the forecast and proceed as before. 
We continue this process through the final policy action in 
October 1985. After that, we extend the forecast uncon-
ditionally through 1986 and 1987. 
The Results 
Before presenting the results of the simulations, we must 
emphasize the need for caution in interpreting the results 
of this exercise. Any econometric forecast is subject to 
large uncertainty due to the estimation of coefficients, 
possible changes in the structure of the economy, and 
other considerations. When we go beyond a forecasting 
exercise and try to make statements about the effects of 
policy, we have to make further assumptions, such as 
those about the form of M and the size of the variance of 
m. These assumptions only increase the uncertainty of 
the results. 
With this cautionary note, we now present the results 
of the exercise (see Table 5). We find that the unexpect-
edly stimulative monetary policy in 1985 raises the 
outlook for real growth by 1.2 percentage points in 1986 
and by 0.7 of a point in 1987. At the same time, the 
stimulative monetary policy is projected to have in-
creased the inflation outlook for both years—most dra-
matically in 1987. The inflation forecast for 1986 is 
up by 1.6 percentage points from a year ago, and half of 
that increase can be attributed to the stimulative mone-
tary policy. For 1987 about 40 percent of the 2.8 
percentage point increase in the inflation forecast (from 
last year's forecast of 2.9 percent to the current one of 
5.7 percent) can be attributed to monetary policy actions 
in 1985. Thus, we can conclude that the stimulative 
monetary policy actions had a significant impact on the 
change in the 1986—87 outlook since last yea?s forecast. 
Summary 
The model projects a year of strong real growth in 1986 
and a slight slowing in 1987. At the same time, inflation is 
projected to start rising steadily over 1986-87. We have 
used the model, together with assumptions about the 
effect of monetary policy actions, to estimate the impact 
that unexpected monetary policy actions in 1985 have 
had on the outlook. The results support the view that 
much of the stronger growth projected for 1986 and 
higher inflation projected for 1987 is due to stimulative 
monetary policy actions taken in 1985. 
10 Robert B. Litterman 
Monetary Policy and the Outlook 
Appendix 
Was Our Model On Target in 1985? 
Last fall's issue of the Quarterly Review published a forecast 
based on our model in an article titled "Above-Average 
National Growth in 1985 and 1986" (Litterman 1984a). Now, 
with the year almost over, it appears rather unlikely that above-
average growth will occur in 1985. Where did the model go 
wrong? How did it perform compared with other forecasts made 
at the time? And how far off target was it? 
Upon closer analysis, it turns out that the model's forecast in 
last year's Quarterly Review was actually more accurate than 
the article's title. The forecasted level for real GNP in the third 
quarter ofl985(1985:3), when compared with the most recent 
actual observation, was just about right. The problem with the 
forecast of above-average growth mentioned in the article's title 
was that it was based on a measure of growth from the fourth 
quarter of one year to the fourth quarter of the next. Since the 
actual level in 1984:4 turned out to be much higher than was 
expected in 1984:3, the actual year-over-year measure of 
growth was much lower than projected, even though the end 
result was about the same. 
Two Performance Measures 
In evaluating the model's overall performance, we examine the 
size of its error in forecasting one year ahead because data on 
quarterly growth rates are very unreliable. On this basis, the 
model performed quite well in 1985—first, when compared 
with other forecasts and, second, when related to its own 
internal probability structure. 
When compared with other forecasts made at the same time, 
our model performed quite respectably. The accompanying 
chart compares the model's November 1984 forecast of real 
GNP and the price level (measured by the GNP deflator) for 
1985:3 with November 1984 forecasts made by other major 
forecasters. Although other forecasts came closer to predicting 
one of the two indicators, our model's came closest to predicting 
both. 
When related to its internal probability structure, the model 
also did well. This relationship can be measured by counting the 
number of times actual values fell within the 70 percent 
confidence bands generated by the model. For the November 
November 1984 Forecasts for Real GNP and the Price Level 
in the Third Quarter of 1985 
(Difference Between Forecasted and Actual Levels) 
El. duPont de Nemours 
Sources of basic data: BVAR model forecast of November 21, 1984; The Conference Board 1984; U.S. Department of Commerce 
11 1984 forecast for 1985:3, the number was 30 out of 42 (or 
roughly 70 percent)—exactly the number that should have 
fallen within the bands. 
The results of these two measures of forecast performance 
are commendable and suggest that the November 1984 forecast 
was successful in at least these respects. But these performance 
measures should not be taken too seriously. The model itself 
suggests that the accuracy of the forecasts of real GNP and 
the price level was largely due to luck. Both forecasts were much 
closer to the actual values than will be true on average. 
Moreover, the deviations of different components of GNP were 
actually relatively large and just happened to offset one another. 
With respect to the 70 percent confidence bands, the nice 
result should also be recognized as only a modicum of evidence. 
It is, after all, only one possible test of the model, and it amounts 
to looking only at a few of the possible ways in which actual 
outcomes were consistent with the model's forecast. 
More-Stringent Tests 
If we were to apply a more stringent test of the model's 
performance by focussing on the interrelationships between the 
model's variables in the one-year-ahead forecast, rather than 
focussing on each variable separately, then we would soundly 
reject the model's probability structure. This more compre-
hensive approach uses more information and looks much more 
carefully at the outcome than do the 70 percent bands. It takes 
the assumptions about the model more seriously, looking, in 
effect, at all the different confidence bands for different 
probabilities and also checking the covariations of the different 
variables. This approach finds inconsistencies that the less 
rigorous test misses—for example, the fact that the monetary 
base fell below its 70 percent band while the money supply 
(Ml) fell above its band. Since unexpected movements in these 
two series are highly correlated historically, this combination of 
events is seen as much more unlikely than each event taken 
independently. 
Similarly, if we examine the monthly forecast errors rather 
than the one-year-ahead errors, we find further inconsistencies. 
For example, one error (for Commodity Credit Corporation 
payments in November 1984) is greater than 9 standard errors 
in size. Even though this is the exceptional error from a sample 
of over 500, if the normality assumption that we make were true, 
then we would virtually never see a 9 standard error innovation. 
Thus, it is clear that if we apply a stringent enough test, we can 
reject at least the normality assumption in the model's proba-
bility structure. This means that we must be very careful not to 
rely on results that depend on such an assumption, but it is not a 
critical assumption for this paper. 
A Lucky Shot 
So on the surface, at least, last year's forecast for 1985 was very 
nearly on target for the model's main variables— real GNP and 
the price level. Still, the model may have been nearly right but 
for the wrong reasons. An archer may hit a bullseye because of 
skillful training, arduous practice, a keen eye, and a steady hand. 
But then again, the shot may just be a lucky one. We may have 
to admit, although reluctantly, that when examined closely, the 
model's forecast accuracy in 1985 may largely have been due to 
luck. 
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